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Articles
The Jack Pemberton Lecture Series
The Great American Makeover: The
Sexing Up and Dumbing Down of
Women's Work After Jespersen v.
Harrah's Operating Company, Inc.
By DIANNE AVERY*
GOOD EVENING DEAN BRAND, faculty, staff, alumni, students,
and guests. I want to thank Professor Maria Ontiveros and the Univer-
sity of San Francisco Law School for inviting me to deliver the Third
Annual Jack Pemberton Lecture on Workplace Justice. One of my col-
leagues at Buffalo, who was a staff attorney for the American Civil Lib-
erties Union ("ACLU") in New York City in the 1970s and '80s (and
still visits there occasionally), reported to me that a photograph of
Jack Pemberton is prominently displayed in the national office and
* Professor of Law, University at Buffalo Law School, The State University of New
York. This Article is based on remarks I delivered on March 15, 2007, at the courthouse of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for the Third Annual Jack
Pemberton Lecture on Workplace Justice sponsored by the University of San Francisco
School of Law. The Pemberton Lecture honors University of San Francisco Professor
Emeritus John J. Pemberton, who taught at USF School of Law from 1973 to 1988. A
pioneer in the field of employment law, Pemberton served as Executive Director of the
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") from 1962 to 1970. He was Acting General
Counsel for the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission ("EEOC") from 1970 to
1971, and he later served as the EEOC Regional Attorney in San Francisco from 1986 to
1994. He currently resides in Sonoma County.
I thank Rachel MacVean at UB Law School for her enormously helpful research
assistance. I owe much to Marion Grain, whose collaborative work with me on our article,
Dianne Avery & Marion Grain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual Stereotyptng, and the New Face
of Capitalism, 14 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'v 13 (2007), has encouraged me to continue
thinking and writing about this topic. Fred Konefsky patiently read and reread drafts of
this lecture, endured with good humor my constant musings about dress and grooming
codes, and wisely gave me just enough advice.
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that his tenure as Executive Director is fondly referred to as the "good
old days." I consider it a great honor to speak to you tonight in his
name and to invoke the memory of a time when many significant bat-
tles in the struggle for civil rights and civil liberties were being waged
and, sometimes, won.
The "good old days," however, may be long gone in more ways
than one: they were preceded by the "not-so-good old days" and have
perhaps now led to what we may look back on as the "bad old days."
My topic tonight is "The Great American Makeover: The Sexing Up
and Dumbing Down of Women's Work AfterJespersen v. Harrah's Oper-
ating Company." I want to use the Ninth Circuit's 2006 en bancJespersen
decision' to demonstrate what a story about a female bartender who
gets fired for refusing to wear makeup tells us about the widespread
commercialization of female sexuality, about the effects of sex-based
appearance codes on women's (and men's) employment opportuni-
ties, and about the crabbed notion-of equality that our federal antidis-
crimination doctrine has produced for working women.
Like many employment lawyers and scholars, I became interested
in the topic of employer dress, grooming, and appearance codes dur-
ing the long saga of the Jespersen litigation. And I have spent a lot of
time thinking about what message this case sends to workers-men
and women, young and old-in American workplaces in the Ninth
Circuit and elsewhere. For starters, despite some deceptively encour-
aging language in the opinion about the possibility of using sex ste-
reotypes to challenge sex-based appearance rules, I think that the case
insulates most employers from all but the most determined (and well-
financed) challenges to sex-based dress, grooming, and appearance
codes under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Only the in-
trepid and the foolhardy will try. The analysis in the opinion is likely
to influence Title VII case law in other circuits, as well as court deci-
sions interpreting state fair-employment statutes-an outcome that
will further entrench in the law an analytical framework that is inco-
herent at best and pernicious at worst.
What will this lead to? Well, the "sexing up" of women and young
girls in advertising, retail merchandising, the media, and the gaming
and entertainment industries is hard to miss in the United States to-
day. We can't blame Congress, the federal courts, or the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") for that. But we can
1. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
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wonder whether the courts and the EEOC are doing their jobs when
women and girls in low-wage, frontline service jobs-selling clothing,
perfume, food, drinks, or casino gaming-are hired for their sex ap-
peal and then dolled up and made up to help sell the company's
product or the service. Professor Marion Crain and I recently pub-
lished an article exploring the mechanisms and consequences of this
sexualized "branding" of human beings through sex-based workplace
dress and grooming rules. 3 The phenomenon is ubiquitous. For ex-
ample, on January 22, 2007, the Seattle Times reported that a young
woman working at a drive-through espresso stand outside Seattle was
wearing "a short, sheer, baby-doll negligee and coordinated pink pant-
ies."'4 The owner of a competing stand called the Bikini Espresso said,
"'The trick is to set your business apart, . . . and sex is one sure-fire
way to do that."' 5 According to the local sheriff, the law requires only
that "'employees cover their breasts and buttocks.'1,6 A seventeen-year-
old high school senior, who read about the "steamy" coffee stands in
her civics class, wrote to the editor of the Seattle Times that she was
"quite disgusted" by the story. 7 She asked: "What are these shops
teaching the women and men of America? That it's OK to objectify a
woman?"8 She added, "I realize times are changing, but this time they
aren't for the better. It's a coffee shop, not a strip club."9 The story is
not new-the EEOC's well publicized battles with Hooters Restaurants
in the 1990s come to mind 1 0-but the Jespersen decision suggests that
employers who want to trade in their workers' brains for beauty, com-
petence for cosmetics, are not likely to find that Title VII sex discrimi-
nation law stands in their way.
3. Dianne Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual Stereotyping, and the
New Face of Capitalism, 14 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 13 (2007).
4. Amy Roe, Some Coffee Stands Get Steamier, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 22, 2007, http://
seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003535398_coffeegirls22e.html.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Jessica Lindquist, Letters to the Editor, Subjugation of Women: Must Today's Girls
Serve the Masters of Primitive Marketing, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 24, 2007, http://archives.seattle
times.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?sug=wedlets2 4 &date=20 0 7 01
24&query=Letters+to+the+editor.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. In 1996, following much adverse publicity and threatened congressional hearings,
the EEOC dropped its investigation of sex discrimination claims brought by men who had
sought front-of-the-house serving positions held exclusively by females dressed as "Hooters
Girls" at Hooters Restaurants. See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights:
The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1401, 1431 (1998); see also Avery &
Crain, supra note 3, at 30 n.90, 106.
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Lest you wonder why so much fuss has been made-and ought to
continue to be made-about the sex discrimination claims of a wo-
man who wanted to keep her job as a bartender, I want to detour
briefly through part of the history of sex discrimination law, with par-
ticular attention to some significant developments in California law
involving women who worked or wanted to work in bars and taverns.
I. A Brief History of Female Bartenders and Sex
Discrimination in California
In 1881, Mary Maguire was arrested and jailed in San Francisco
for "waiting on persons in a bar-room where liquors were sold."" Au-
thorities charged her with violating a local ordinance that made her
conduct, if performed by a female, a misdemeanor. 12 She brought a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the ordinance under
the California Constitution of 1879, article XX, section 18, which then
provided: "No person shall on account of sex be disqualified from en-
tering upon or pursuing any lawful business, vocation, or profes-
sion."'-" The city supervisors argued that the ordinance did not
disqualify her "on account of sex, but on account of... immorality;
that such employment of a woman is of a vicious tendency, and hurt-
ful to sound public morality."'14 In bold and decisive language, the
California Supreme Court, en banc, struck down the ordinance as un-
constitutional, finding that while the state had the power to legislate
"to prevent practices hurtful to public morality," if it enacted laws to
accomplish this purpose "by affecting or operating upon lawful call-
ings, [it] shall affect both sexes alike."' 5 Within a few years, the California
Supreme Court beat a hasty retreat. By 1893, the court upheld an or-
dinance nearly identical to the one struck down in 1881, prohibiting
female waitresses in any establishment selling "spirituous, malt, or fer-
mented liquors."' 6
11. In re Mary Maguire, 57 Cal. 604, 605 (1881) (en banc).
12. Id.
13. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 18. The language of article XX, section 18, of the Califor-
nia Constitution has been amended several times and was renumbered article I, section 8,
in 1974. The present-day language in the constitution's Declaration of Rights provides: "A
person may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation,
or employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or national or ethnic origin." CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 8.
14. Mary Maguire, 57 Cal. at 606-07.
15. Id. at 609 (emphasis added).
16. Ex parte Hayes, 33 P. 337, 337 (Cal. 1893) (per curiam). The court ruled that the
constitutional provision prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in employment did
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The effect of such ordinances limiting women's opportunities
may, in any event, have only accentuated social pressures keeping wo-
men out of work in bars. 17 In 1890, less than one percent of bartend-
ers nationwide were female.18 Following the repeal of Prohibition in
1933,19 the all-male Bartenders Union asserted a rigid male monopoly
on unionized bartender jobs,20 and states like California once again
banned most female bartenders under the newly enacted Alcoholic
Beverage Control Acts. 21 The resulting pervasive sex segregation in
bartending was buttressed by societal attitudes about appropriate sex
roles-attitudes that were shared by many female workers in food ser-
vices. 2 By 1940 only 2.5% of bartenders were women.23 During World
War II, when thousands of male bartenders left for military service
and war industries, some women filled vacant bartending positions
just as many others entered previously "male" jobs in the wartime
economy.24
When the veteran bartenders returned from the front, however,
the Bartenders Union locals in many states convinced their legisla-
tures to enact laws banning women from bartending jobs unless they
were the wife or daughter of a male proprietor. 25 In 1948, in an opin-
ion written by Justice Frankfurter, the United States Supreme Court
upheld such a classification in a Michigan statute that had been chal-
lenged on equal protection grounds.2 6 The Frankfurter opinion,
not limit the regulation of the "manner" and "conditions" under which businesses con-
ducted the retail sale of liquor. Id. at 338.
17. The following discussion, infra text accompanying notes 18-56, on the history of
women in bartending is based, in part, on the author's discussion of the feminization of
bartending in Avery & Crain, supra note 3, at 92-100.
18. Linda A. Detman, Women Behind Bars: The Feminization of Bartending, in BARBARA F.
RESKIN & PATRICIA A. Roos, JOB QUEUES, GENDER QUEUES: EXPLAINING WOMEN'S INROADS
INTO MALE OCCUPATIONS 241, 241 (1990).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
20. Detman, supra note 18, at 243.
21. See, e.g., People v.Jemnez, 121 P.2d 543, 544-45 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1942)
(upholding the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, 1937 Gen. Laws Ch. 681, § 56.4, which
banned female bartenders who were not a licensee or wife of a licensee, against a challenge
brought under article XX, section 18, of the California Constitution and Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection and privileges and immunities theories).
22. DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, DISHING IT OUT: WAITRESSES AND THEIR UNIONS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 168-69 (1991).
23. Detman, supra note 18, at 241.
24. MATTHEW JOSEPHESON, UNION HOUSE, UNION BAR: THE HISTORY OF THE HOTEL
AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES AND BARTENDERS INTERNATIONAL UNION 297 (1956); see also
COBBLE, supra note 22, at 166.
25. Detman, supra note 18, at 244.
26. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
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Goesaert v. Clealy,2 7 reminds us of women's precarious legal and social
status in the middle of the last century. Justice Frankfurter wrote that
"Michigan could, beyond question, forbid all women from working
behind a bar,"28 and that equal protection doctrine "does not require
legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards,
any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific
standards."29 Justice Frankfurter concluded that, "[s]ince bartending
by women may .. .give rise to moral and social problems,"30 states
were free to act on even outmoded stereotypes about women in order
"to devise preventive measures. '3 1 The touchstone was whether the
legislature's distinction between classes of women had "a basis in rea-
son."32 With a green light from the Supreme Court, by 1960 twenty-six
states had enacted new statutes banning most women from the occu-
pation of bartending.33
The California legislature was comfortably in the middle of the
pack. By 1953, the so-called female bartender provision of the State's
Business and Professions Code banned women who were not married
to the licensee of a bar from "dispensing" or serving alcoholic bever-
ages.3 4 Well into the late 1960s and early 1970s, courts relied on
Goesaert, as well as the State constitution and the State's authority to
regulate the intrastate sale of liquor under the Twenty-First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, to fend off Title VI, equal
protection, privileges and immunities, and due process challenges to
California's statutory sex-based bartender classification. 35 By 1970, wo-
27. Id.
28. Id. at 465.
29. Id. at 466.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 467.
33. COBBLE, supra note 22, at 166.
34. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25656 (Deering 1937), repealed by ch. 152, § 1, 1971 Cal.
Stat. 203.
35. See, e.g., Krauss v. Sacramento Inn, 314 F. Supp. 171, 177-78 (E.D. Cal. 1970)
(citing Goesaert, 335 U.S. 464, and upholding California's "female bartender" ban under
the theory that the Twenty-First Amendment of the United States Constitution preempted
authority of Congress under section 703(a) (1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970), to rely on the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to
enforce the ban on sex discrimination as applied to bartenders); Hargens v. Alcoholic
Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 69 Cal. Rptr. 868, 874-76 (Ct. App. 1968) (citing Goesaert,
335 U.S. 464, and upholding state ban on female bartenders not married to licensee of
premises against equal protection and privileges and immunities challenges); People v.
Gardner, 1966 WL 4085, at *4 (Cal. Mun. Ct. 1966) (ruling that, because "bad or unpopu-
lar laws can only be changed by lawful procedure," the statutory female bartender prohibi-
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men held just over twenty percent of bartender positions
nationwide.36
Then, in 1971, in the unanimous decision Sail'er Inn v. Kirby,
the California Supreme Court struck down the state's female bar-
tender statute on the grounds that (1) it violated article XX, section
18, of the California Constitution, which prohibited laws imposing
sex-based qualifications on any business, vocation, or profession, 3 8 (2)
it violated the equal protection clauses of both the state and federal
constitutions,3 9 and (3) it conflicted with the prohibition of employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of sex in section 703(a) of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 196440 and could not be defended under
section 703(e) (1) of Title V114 1 as a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion ("BFOQ"). 4 2 Citing the court's 1881 decision of In re Mary
Maguire,43 Justice Peters wrote that the language in section 18 of arti-
cle XX of the California Constitution,4 4 prohibiting sex discrimina-
tion in vocations,
does not admit of exceptions based on popular notions of what is a
proper, fitting or moral occupation for persons of either sex. Al-
though an inability to perform the tasks required by a particular
occupation, sex-linked or not, may be ajustification for discrimina-
tion against job applicants, under section 18, mere prejudice, how-
ever ancient, common or socially acceptable, is not.
45
With regard to the state's Title VII BFOQ defense that women as
a class are incapable of dealing with inebriated customers and keeping
order in the bar, the court observed that "the saloon days of the Wild
West are long gone. Nowadays the typical bar does not provide a set-
tion in California Business and Professional Code section 25656 must be upheld as
constitutional under Califoria Consitution article XX, section 18).
36. Detman, supra note 18, at 241.
37. 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971) (en banc).
38. Id. at 533-34.
39. Id. at 538-43.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1) (providing that "it shall not be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to hire and employ employees.., on the basis of his religion, sex,
or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise").
42. Sail'er Inn, 485 P.2d at 536-38.
43. 57 Cal. 604, 605 (1881) (en banc).
44. Sail'er Inn, 485 P.2d at 533 & n.5 (noting that the language of article XX, section
18, of the California Constitution was amended in 1970 to read that "[a] person may not
be disqualified because of sex, from entering or pursuing a lawful business, vocation, or
profession").
45. Id. at 533 (overruling Ex parte Hayes, 33 P. 337 (Cal. 1893)).
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ting for violence and danger, if in fact it ever did."46 As to equal pro-
tection, the court adopted strict scrutiny for sex-based
classifications 47 -the first state high court to do so. 48 Noting the
"stigma of inferiority and second class citizenship associated with [sus-
pect classifications] ,"49 the court concluded "that the [statute's] sex-
ual classifications are properly treated as suspect, particularly when
those classifications are made with respect to a fundamental interest
such as employment."50 Then, in words later "borrowed" nearly verba-
tim 5 ' by the United States Supreme Court in Frontiero v. Richardson,52
Justice Peters trenchantly observed: "The pedestal upon which women
have been placed has all too often, upon closer inspection, been re-
vealed as a cage."5 3
Through the 1970s, female bartender statutes and male-only bar-
tenders' unions were abandoned in the face of Title VII challenges, 54
and many women became bartenders, rapidly feminizing the profes-
sion.55 As the 1980s came to a close, women held a majority of jobs
behind the bar,56 a pattern that continues today. In 2004, women held
more than half of the nearly 200,000 full-time bartending positions in
the United States.57
II. A Modem Tale of Sex Discrimination: Jespersen v.
Harrah's Operating Company
So now we come to the case ofJespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 58
the 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which
46. Id. at 538.
47. Id. at 539.
48. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution: The State of the Art, 14 WO-
MEN'S RTS. L. REP. 361, 362 (1992).
49. Sad'er Inn, 485 P.2d at 540.
50. Id. at 541.
51. See Ginsburg, supra note 48, at 363.
52. 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
53. Sail'er Inn, 485 P.2d at 541.
54. See, e.g., Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding
that sex-segregated union locals of waiters and waitresses violate Title VII).
55. COBBLE, supra note 22, at 170 (noting that during the 19 7 0s and 1980s,
"[b]artending [was] feminized more rapidly ... than virtually any other occupation");
BARBARA F. RESKIN & PATRICIA A. Roos,JoB QUEUES, GENDER QUEUES: EXPLAINING WOMEN'S
INROADS INTO MALE OCCUPATIONS 54 (1990) (noting the same trend).
56. COBBLE, supra note 22, at 170.
57. See Avery & Crain, supra note 3, at 95 nn.492-93 (citing data from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics). In 2004, there were nearly one-half million bartending jobs, including
part-time positions. Id. at n.492.
58. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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it "took... en banc in order to reaffirm [the circuit's] law on appear-
ance and grooming standards, and to clarify [its] evolving law of sex
stereotyping claims."59 To begin with the facts: In 2000, Harrah's Op-
erating Company, following the recommendations of a Las Vegas-
based image consultant, adopted new appearance and grooming stan-
dards for beverage service employees at twenty of its casinos nation-
wide.60 The new standards-named the "Personal Best" program-
called for both men and women to wear "a standard uniform of black
pants, white shirt, black vest, and black bow tie" and included several
sex-specific requirements for hair styling, makeup use, and nail
grooming.61
Within a few months, Harrah's amended its grooming standards,
mandating that all female beverage servers, including bartenders,
wear face powder, blush, mascara, and lipstick in -complimentary
[sic] colors."' 62 Harrah's professional image consultant would design
the makeup "template" for each female bartender and "dictate[ ]
where and how the makeup had to be applied."63 To ensure that fe-
male beverage workers applied and wore their makeup properly at all
times, supervisors would use photographs of each employee, taken at
her "Personal Best," to evaluate her appearance on the job.64 Female
bartenders also had to wear their hair "'down at all times,' "'teased,
curled, or styled'- 65 and could wear nail polish only in "'clear, white,
pink or red color."' 66 The rules, on the other hand, prohibited male
bartenders from wearing any eye or facial makeup or colored nail po-
lish, or from having their hair extend below their shirt collars or wear-
ing ponytails. 67
Darlene Jespersen, who had "worked successfully as a bartender
in Harrah's Reno casino for twenty years,' 68 was, in effect, fired be-
cause she refused to wear the prescribed makeup. 69 There is no ques-
59. Id. at 1105.
60. Id. at 1107.
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting Harrah's written grooming guidelines for "Beverage Bartenders and
Barbacks").
63. Id. at 1114 (Pregerson,J., dissenting).
64. SeeJespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'g
granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), affd, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); see
also id. at 1084 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107 (quoting Harrah's grooming guidelines).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1106-07.
69. Id. at 1108; see alsoJespersen, 392 F.3d at 1083 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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tion that Jespersen was an outstanding bartender. Her supervisors
consistently praised her work, 70 and her customers had such high re-
gard for her that they called the sports bar where she worked
"Darlene's bar. '71 Nevertheless, when Harrah's asked her to comply
with the new grooming standard she balked. 72 She had tried wearing
makeup briefly at work during the 1980s, in response to a supervisor's
request,73 and she found it made her feel "'dolled up' like a sexual
object."74 Since that time, she had never worn makeup "on or off the
job,"75 and her sworn testimony was that she found "wearing makeup
degrading and intrusive. '7 6
In 2001, after exhausting her administrative remedies with the
EEOC, Jespersen filed a lawsuit in federal district court in Nevada,
alleging disparate treatment on the basis of sex in violation of section
703(a) (1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. 77
The district court granted summary judgment to Harrah's. 7 In 2004,
Jespersen lost her appeal to the Ninth Circuit, 79 with one judge dis-
senting.80 The court then granted her petition for rehearing en
banc.81 On April 14, 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
issued its en banc decision affirming the judgment for Harrah's. 82 In
an opinion written by Chief Judge Schroeder, a seven-judge majority
agreed with the district court and the panel majority that Jespersen
had failed to present sufficient evidence to survive summary judg-
70. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107 (noting Jespersen's "exemplary record"); see alsoJesper-
sen, 392 F.3d at 1077 (majority opinion) (describing supervisors' high praise ofJespersen's
work).
71. Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, Jespersen, 392 F.3d 1076 (No.
03-15045).
72. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108.
73. Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1077.
74. Id.
75. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107.
76. Id. at 1118 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1108 (majority opinion).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000); seeJespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 280 F.
Supp. 2d 1189, 1190 (D. Nev. 2002), 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'ggranted, 409 F.3d
1061 (9th Cir. 2005), affd, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006); see alsoJespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108.
78. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1195.
79. Jespersen, 392 F.3d 1076.
80. Id. at 1083 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
81. Jespersen, 409 F.3d 1061.
82. Jespersen, 444 F.3d 1104.
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ment.8 3 Four judges dissented in two separate opinions written by
Judges Pregerson and Kozinski.
84
III. Jespersen's Three Principles
Although Darlene Jespersen lost her case in the sense that she
never made it to trial, the Ninth Circuit clarified three important prin-
ciples, which should guide plaintiffs in future dress and grooming
cases. Significantly, all eleven judges agreed upon these three
principles.
First, as a threshold issue, the court was unanimous in agreeing
that workplace "appearance standards and grooming policies may be
subject to Title VII claims," 5 implicitly rejecting the "immutable char-
acteristics" limitation that had been articulated in cases from the
1970s8 6 and invoked by the district court.8 7 This theory, now discred-
ited in the Ninth Circuit, asserts that Tide VII reaches only immutable
characteristics, such as one's race, color, or sex, and not mutable as-
pects of appearance such as one's hair style, use of cosmetics, or
dress. 88
Second, the court unanimously reaffirmed circuit court prece-
dents, many of which dated from or reaffirmed case law from the
1970s,8 9 on the legitimacy of the "unequal burdens" test in Title VII
challenges to appearance standards and grooming policies. 90 Essen-
tially this theory, long endorsed by the EEOC, 91 posits that a groom-
ing policy "'that imposes different but essentially equal burdens on
83. Id. at 1106. The court held thatJespersen had failed to produce sufficient evi-
dence to support her claims "that the [grooming] policy imposes an unequal burden on
women" or "that the challenged policy was part of a policy motivated by sex stereotyping."
Id.
84. Id. at 1113 (Pregerson,J., dissenting), 1117 (KozinskiJ., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1113 (Pregerson,J., dissenting).
86. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975);
Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974); see alsoJespersen v. Harrah's
Operating Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1192 (D. Nev. 2002) (discussing Bakercase), 392 F.3d
1076 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'ggranted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), affd, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th
Cir. 2006); Jespersen, 392 F.3d 1076, 1080 (acknowledging rejection of Baker in the Ninth
Circuit).
87. Jespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1192. This proposition was rejected in the Jespersen
panel decision, 392 F.3d at 1080, and the Jespersen en banc decision, 444 F.3d at 1106.
88. SeeJespersen, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
89. See Michael Selmi, The Many Faces ofDarleneJespersen, 14 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'V
467, 470 n.10 (2007).
90. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108-09, 1113 (Pregerson,J., dissenting), 1117 (KozinskiJ.,
dissenting).
91. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) § 619.4(d), 3606 (2007).
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men and women is not disparate treatment.'" 92 Because Jespersen
had failed to present comparative evidence of the discriminatory effects
that the grooming rules imposed on men and women in terms of their
time and cost, eight of the judges agreed that there was no triable
issue of fact regarding unequal burdens.93 Three dissenting judges,
however, believed that it was appropriate to take judicial notice of the
"incontrovertible facts" that "Harrah's overall grooming policy is sub-
stantially more burdensome for women than for men. '9 4 As Judge
Kozinski asked in his dissent, "[I]s there any doubt that putting on
makeup costs money and takes time? Harrah's policy requires women
to apply face powder, blush, mascara and lipstick. You don't need an
expert witness to figure out that such items don't grow on trees."95
Nevertheless, none of the four dissenters had any quarrel with the
legitimacy of the unequal burdens test in principle, 96 although three
of them objected to the majority's application of the test to the facts of
the case. 97
Finally, disagreeing with both the district court and the panel ma-
jority, the en banc court inJespersen unanimously adopted, for the first
time in the circuit, the theory that a prima facie case of intentional sex
discrimination can be based on evidence that an employer's "chal-
lenged [grooming] policy was part of a policy motivated by sex stere-
otyping."98 The court held that "appearance standards, including
makeup requirements, may well be the subject of a Title VII claim for
sexual stereotyping." 99 All eleven judges, including the four dissent-
ers, agreed with this proposition. 100 Nevertheless, the majority-seven
judges-ruled thatJespersen could not survive summary judgment on
this theory because she had failed to present sufficient evidence that
Harrah's makeup requirement for female bartenders was motivated
by sex stereotyping. 10 1 The majority discounted Jespersen's deposition
92. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109 (majority opinion) (quoting Frank v. United Airlines,
216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000)).
93. This position was held by the majority inJespersen, id. at 1111, and by Judge Preger-
son in his dissent, id. at 1113, but not by Judge Kozinski and the two judges joining his
dissent, id. at 1117.
94. Id. at 1117 (KozinskiJ., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1113 (Pregerson,J., dissenting), 1117 (KozinskiJ., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1113-14 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1106 (majority opinion).
99. Id.
100. See zd. at 1113 (Pregerson, J., dissenting), 1117 (KozinskiJ., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1106, 1108, 1113 (majority opinion).
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testimony'0 2 that wearing makeup made her feel "'very degraded and
very demeaned,"' 10 3 and it treated her views as "the subjective reac-
tion of a single employee."'01 4 In the absence of evidence that wearing
makeup "would objectively impede her ability to perform her job re-
quirements as a bartender"10 5 or evidence of "discriminatory or sexu-
ally stereotypical intent" on the face of the policy,' 0 6 the court ruled
that Jespersen could not make out a prima facie case of sex
discrimination. 10 7
All four dissenters, however, believed that Harrah's "'Personal
Best' program was part of a policy motivated by sex stereotyping and
thatJespersen's termination for failing to comply with the program's
requirements was 'because of her sex.' "108 Judge Pregerson wrote in
dissent: Jespersen's "termination for failing to comply with a groom-
ing policy that imposed a facial uniform on only female bartenders is
discrimination 'because of sex. Such discrimination is clearly and
unambiguously impermissible under Title VII, which requires that
'gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.' "109
Previous Ninth Circuit precedent had limited gender-stereotyp-
ing analysis to sexual harassment cases."l 0 Under this theory, because
102. Id. at 1108.
103. Id. (quoting deposition testimony of Darlene Jespersen).
104. Id. at 1113.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1112.
107. Id. at 1108-09.
108. Id. at 1114 (Pregerson,J., dissenting). Judge Thomas, in his dissent to the panel
decision in Jespersen, asserted thatJespersen had raised a triable issue of fact under both a
Price Waterhouse gender-stereotypes approach and an "unequal burdens" theory. In his view,
there was no justification under Tide VII for not extending to "men and women in service
industries, who are more likely to be subject to policies like Harrah's 'Personal Best' policy,
... the protection that white-collar professionals receive." Id. at 1085.
109. Id. at 1114 (Pregerson,J., dissenting) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 240 (1989) (plurality) (alteration by Pregerson, J.)). This position is consistent
with Judge Skelly Wright's dicta in the early hostile work environment case of Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Sexual stereotyping through discriminatory
dress requirements may be benign in intent, and may offend women only in a general,
atmospheric manner, yet it violates Tide VII.").
110. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 305 F.3d 1061, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (relying on
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, to allow a male waiter to bring a same-sex sexual harassment
claim on the basis of allegations that he was harassed because he did not conform to stere-
otypical male behavior). The Nichols court, in dicta, commented: "[O]ur decision does not
imply that there is any violation of Title VII occasioned by reasonable regulations that
require male and female employees to conform to different dress and grooming stan-
dards." Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875 n.7; seeJespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112-13 (majority opinion)
(discussing Rene and Nichols cases).
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Darlene Jespersen had not alleged that Harrah's grooming policy had
subjected her to sexual harassment, she could have no claim for re-
lief.' 1' In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,'a2 however, the Supreme Court
ruled that when a senior partner at a major accounting firm told a
female accountant that she could improve her candidacy for partner-
ship if she would "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jew-
elry,"' a 3 it was direct evidence that the decision to deny her partner-
ship was motivated, at least in part, by unlawful gender stereotypes." 14
IV. The Ninth Circuit's Misreading of Title VII
While I agree that workplace appearance standards and groom-
ing policies should be subject to challenges under Title VII, and I
would certainly endorse the notion that such employer policies based
on sex stereotypes should be subject to Title VII claims, I believe that
the Ninth Circuit has gone astray in its articulation and application of
both the unequal burdens and "sex stereotyping" theories in this case.
Indeed, the Jespersen court's analysis of the theories and evidentiary
burdens in both its unequal burdens and sex stereotypes prongs are
completely unmoored from the statutory language of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964115 and its amendments in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.116 Essentially, the Jespersen court has begged and borrowed
from various Title VII doctrines, including case law from the 1970s, 117
to cobble together an incoherent framework for cases challenging sex-
based grooming codes. In the end, the court has abandoned founda-
tional Title VII principles of ensuring equality for individuals in the
protected classes faced with either discriminatory treatment or arbi-
trary barriers to employment opportunity, thereby forcing workers to
serve the hypersexualized demands of the consumer market and the
sex-stereotyped whims of image consultants.
The court's approach in Jespersen elevates the employer's interest
in profiting from the appearance-not the competence-of its em-
ployees above the principles of nondiscrimination. Such caution by
the courts is, at times, warranted: nearly thirty years ago, in an oft-
111. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112-13.
112. 490 U.S. 228.
113. Id. at 235 (plurality) (internal quotes and citation omitted).
114. See id. at 255-56, 276-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-1 7 (2000).
116. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 86 and 89.
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quoted passage, the Supreme Court warned that "[c] ourts are gener-
ally less competent than employers to restructure business practices,
and unless mandated to do so by Congress, they should not attempt
it." 1 18 Congress, nevertheless, has mandated that employees should
not be fired "because of ... sex," that employees should not be sub-
jected to different terms and conditions "because of... sex," and that
employers should not "classify" their employees "because of...
sex." 119 It is time for the courts to step up to their responsibilities of
enforcing the civil rights laws as they were written, not as the courts
wish they were written.
A. Unequal Burdens
Let me briefly sketch out why the Ninth Circuit, even the dissent-
ing judges, got it so wrong in Jespersen regarding "unequal burdens."
Interestingly, the court does not cite to any statutory language to sup-
port its unequal burdens doctrine because it can't-the court is boxed
in. First, if the court were to find that Harrah's "Personal Best" groom-
ing policy was on its face an explicit classification on the basis of sex,
then, under Supreme Court precedent, the court would be compelled
to find that the policy itself "is sex discrimination ... and thus may be
defended only as a BFOQ.' 120 Jespersen's counsel strenuously argued
this position on appeal, 121 but the court would have none of it, con-
cluding, rather bizarrely, that "[g] rooming standards that appropriately
differentiate between the genders are not facially discriminatory." 122
How do the courts determine that facially sex-based grooming re-
quirements are "reasonable"'123 and "'imposed in an evenhanded
manner on all employees . . . [with] only a negligible effect on em-
118. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).
119. Title VII § 703(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2); seeJespersen v. Harrah's
Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1114 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting).
120. UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991). The Supreme Court has
long recognized that the BFOQ or "bona fide occupational qualification," defense under
Title VII § 703(e)(1), is an "extremely narrow" statutory defense. Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); see, e.g., Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198, 201 ("The BFOQ de-
fense is written narrowly, and this Court has read it narrowly."); see also Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1989).
121. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109 & n.1 (majority opinion) (citing Title VII
§ 703(e) (1)); see also Corrected Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 30-36, Jespersen v.
Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15045); Reply Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellant at 18-20, id. (No. 03-15045).
122. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109-10 (emphasis added).
123. See id. at 1113 (concluding that, in evaluating grooming standards for sexual stere-
otyping, "the touch-stone is reasonableness"), 1110 ("Under established equal burdens
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ployment opportunities' "?124 Perhaps in the same way that courts in
the "not-so-good old days" concluded that state legislation banning
women from working in bars was not a denial of equal protection on
the basis of sex. What is "reasonable" about a policy that women must
wear makeup as a condition of holding ajob that can be performed by
both men and women? What is "negligible" about being fired because
you are a woman who does not want to wear makeup and has per-
formed her job well for twenty years without makeup?
The court does not tell us on what basis it concludes that differ-
ent treatment of men and women is "reasonable" and "appropriate."
Should we not be concerned, however, that the court seems to be de-
ferring to the employer's (and its own) unarticulated assumptions
about reasonableness, rather than shifting the burden to the em-
ployer to justify the sex-based classification in its grooming policy?
The court's approach reminds me of the Supreme Court's deferential
language in Plessy v. Ferguson125: "In determining the question of rea-
sonableness, [the legislature] is at liberty to act with reference to the
established usages, customs, and traditions of the people .... 126
There is nothing in Title VII to suggest that, for purposes of es-
tablishing a prima facie case of discrimination, sex is to be treated any
differently from race, color, religion, or national origin. The substan-
tive elements of the claim of disparate treatment are the same regard-
less of the identity of the plaintiffs protected class. Furthermore,
section 703(a) (2) of Title VII,127 which is generally relied on as statu-
tory support for disparate impact claims, 128 expressly prohibits classify-
ing employees on the basis of sex, as well as race, color, religion, and
national origin, and courts view such "classifications" as a form of dis-
parate treatment. 129 Thus, no one would seriously argue that an em-
ployer could lawfully classify its employees by race-whites or African-
analysis, when an employer's grooming and appearance policy does not unreasonably bur-
den one gender more than the other, that policy will not violate Title VII.").
124. Id. at 1110 (quoting Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975)).
125. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
126. Id. at 550.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (2000).
128. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982).
129. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655 n.9 (1989) (observ-
ing, in dicta, that employees could challenge "segregated dormitories and eating facilities
in the workplace... under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2) [Title VII § 703(a) (2)] without show-
ing a disparate impact on hiring or promotion"). Section 703(a) (2) makes it unlawful for
an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2).
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Americans-or by national origin-Japanese, Italian, or Swedish-
and impose different but "reasonable" and "appropriate" dress and
grooming codes on each group of employees. The classification itself
violates the statute, and, other than the BFOQ defense, 130 there is no
language in the statute that would permit "reasonable" classifications
or "appropriate" limitations based on a protected status. As Jesper-
sen's attorney, Jennifer Pizer, has noted, "Title VII has no exemption
for [employer] appearance rules."''1 1
The Jespersen court does rule, however, that a plaintiff can estab-
lish a prima facie case that a grooming policy imposes unequal bur-
dens by producing admissible evidence comparing the relative time
and costs imposed on each sex to comply with the policy. 132 This
places on the plaintiff the burden of coming forward with evidence
that is uniquely within the control of the employer, who has studied
and designed the grooming requirements. The plaintiff bears this
heavy burden after she has already shown that the policy classifies and
treats employees differently because of sex.
Moreover, even if plaintiffs in future cases are able to produce
evidence of the relative time and cost of sex-based grooming rules,
employers conceivably could just compensate the burdened employ-
ees to mitigate the burden. For example, Harrah's could pay its fe-
male bartenders for the cost of purchasing the required makeup and
allow them time on the clock to apply and remove it each day. No
harm, no foul-the burden on men and women is equalized. Of
course, the absurdity of such an approach is apparent when one asks if
there is any limiting principle to what appearance changes an em-
ployer can buy. Is it only temporary changes like uniforms, facial or
otherwise, that can be donned and doffed each work day? What about
more permanent changes? Can an employer condition the employ-
ment of women, but not men, on their agreement to receive botox
injections as long as the employer pays for the time, the cost, and the
130. Title VII § 703(e) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1). The statutory BFOQ defense, by
its own terms, does not apply to classifications on the bases of race or color. Id. See the text
of the statute quoted supra note 41. Arguably the BFOQ defense applies only to decisions
to "hire and employ" on the basis of sex and not to sex-differentiated terms and conditions
of work. See David B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics, and Title VI, 5 NEV. L.J.
240, 244-45 (2004). See the discussion of the BFOQdefense, supra note 120 and accompa-
nying text and infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
131. Jennifer C. Pizer, Facial Discrimination: Darlene Jespersen's Fight Against the Barbie-
fication of Bartenders, 14 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 285, 303 n.81 (2007).
132. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).
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health risks? If botox injections are okay, why not breast
augmentation?
To focus only on the time and cost of sex-based grooming rules,
and to ignore the status and dignitary harms to women either as indi-
viduals or as a class, 133 is like saying that the trip between point A and
point B takes the same amount of time and costs the same whether
one rides in the front of the bus or in the back. Discrimination is just
not for sale.
B. Sex Stereotyping
This brings me to the court's sex stereotyping analysis injespersen.
The Ninth Circuit held that Jespersen could not survive summary
judgment on a sex-stereotyping theory because she had failed to pre-
sent sufficient evidence that Harrah's was motivated by sex stereotypes
in devising its appearance rules for bartenders. 34 It is important to
recognize that Darlene Jespersen had produced evidence that her
sex-the fact that she was a female bartender-was the sole reason that
Harrah's required her to wear makeup, and "but for" the fact that she
was a female bartender, she would not have lost her job for refusing to
wear makeup.13 5 Thus, she demonstrated with direct evidence both
unlawful intent based on sex, as stated in the sex-based classifications
on the face of Harrah's policy, and the strictest form of causation-
"but for"-linking Harrah's intent to her firing. In such a case, to find
an unlawful employment practice under Title VII, it was not necessary
forJespersen to prove, as the majority asserted, that Harrah's groom-
ing policy itself was motivated by sex stereotypes.13 6
In many respects, although Price Waterhouse 37 is instructive about
the harms to women of de facto sex-stereotyped dress and grooming
norms, it is inapposite to a case like Jespersen, which involves de jure
sex-based grooming rules. In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff did not
have evidence of a facially discriminatory policy against promoting fe-
male accountants or a prescribed sex-based dress and grooming code
that would allow only appropriately "feminine" female accountants to
become partners. Therefore, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
133. See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-examining
Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REv. 1111 (2006) (analyzing the
dignitary harms of workplace appearance regulation through the lens of tort law).
134. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1106.
135. See id. at 1114 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
136. See id. at 1113 (majority opinion) (" [T] here is no evidence of stereotypical motiva-
tion on the part of the employer.").
137. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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reasonable inferences that can be drawn from evidence of sex stere-
otyping in the employer's decision-making process in order to show
that the employer was motivated by sex. 138 Relying on expert testi-
mony, the Court recognized that the assumption that women-but
not men-must wear makeup and appear "feminine" to look profes-
sional is based on a commonly held stereotype about women's appear-
ance. 139 After Price Waterhouse, it should not take an expert to
determine that Harrah's makeup policy was based on a sex stereotype.
Where, as in Jespersen, employees are expressly classified on the
basis of sex (or race, color, religion, or national origin), subjected to
different terms and conditions of employment according to their clas-
sification, and then fired if they refuse to comply with the employer's
terms and conditions mandated by their classification, it really
shouldn't matter what motivated the employer to create the classifica-
tion. It could have been a "reasonable" and "appropriate" sex stereo-
type (which really isn't a sex stereotype according to the analysis of
the Ninth Circuit majority); it could have been a malevolent intent to
demean, humiliate, and objectify women; it could have been a benev-
olent intent to help female workers-to improve their psyches by im-
proving their looks; or it could have been whim or caprice. The
Supreme Court in UAW v. Johnson Controls140 made it clear that "the
absence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discrimina-
tory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect. Whether
an employment practice involves disparate treatment through explicit
facial discrimination does not depend on why the employer discrimi-
nates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination."'
' 41
In addition, the Jespersen majority concluded that the "record con-
tains nothing to suggest [Harrah's] grooming standards would objec-
tively inhibit a woman's ability to do thejob.' 42 The court thus improperly
imported a requirement that Jespersen meet an element of a hostile
work environment claim into her prima facie case of disparate treat-
138. Id. at 250-52 (plurality), 272-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 235-36 (plurality), 255-56 (discussing relevance of expert testimony by Dr.
Susan Fiske, a social psychologist, about the role of sex stereotypes in the defendant's eval-
uation of the plaintiff for promotion).
140. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
141. Id. at 199. This principle was acknowledged in the now-vacated majority opinion
of the threejudge panel in Jespersen. See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d
1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199), reh'g granted, 409
F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
142. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1113.
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ment.143 Jespersen was not a hostile work environment case. 144 Rather it
was a claim that the employer engaged in disparate treatment by
promulgating a sex-based grooming code that was a mandatory condi-
tion of employment. If an employer adopts an explicit sex-based pay
differential or a sex-based bonus system, and the plaintiff has pro-
duced evidence of the policy, the plaintiff does not have to demon-
strate, in addition, that the sex-differentiated policy objectively
inhibits her ability to do the job in order to establish a prima facie
case of sex discrimination. Indeed, if sexual harassment law has any
light to shed on Jespersen's claim, it is that it looks more like a quid
pro quo case than a hostile work environment case (i.e., it is more like
an agent of the employer saying "doll yourself up by wearing this
makeup or I'll fire you").
The Jespersen majority, then, was wrong to require the plaintiff to
go behind the express terms of the grooming policy to determine
Harrah's motive in creating it. In Supreme Court cases like Johnson
Controls,1 4 5 Dothard v. Rawlinson,1 4 6 Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart,1 47 and Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,148 which all dealt with
explicit sex-based policies, the Court recognized that once the plain-
tiff proves that an employer's policy is facially discriminatory, the de-
fendant is liable under Title VII, unless it can meet its statutory BFOQ
defense. Harrah's would no doubt have lost at trial if it had been re-
quired to justify its sex-based grooming policy under the "extremely
narrow" 1 49 BFOQ defense under section 703(e)(1) of Title VII, 150
which, among other things, does not permit employers to discrimi-
nate on the basis of customer preferences.' 5 1 Moreover, if sex were "a
143. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (holding that "[c]onduct that
is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environ-
ment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond
Title VII's purview"). See also Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Harris. "It suffices to prove
that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, as the plain-
tiff did, that the harassment so altered working conditions as to 'ma[kle it more difficult to
do the job."' Id. at 25 (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co.,
858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988)).
144. SeeJespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112 ("Nor is this a case of sexual harassment.").
145. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
146. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
147. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
148. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
149. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1114 n.2 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (citing Dothard, 433
U.S. at 334).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1) (2000).
151. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), 404 U.S. 950
(1971) (holding that being female is not a BFOQ for the job of flight attendant), cert.
denied; see also Wilson v. Sw. Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292, 302 n.24 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (noting
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motivating factor" in Harrah's decision to fire Jespersen-as it quite
clearly was152-the company would have committed an unfair employ-
ment practice. 153 Even if it had other nondiscriminatory reasons to
fire her, Harrah's could, at most, limit its remedies by asserting the
mixed-motive, same-decision affirmative defense under Title VII. 154 In
addition, one of the 1991 amendments to Title VII 5 expressly pro-
hibits employers from defending claims of intentional discrimination
on the basis of "business necessity."' 56 Employers may raise the "busi-
ness necessity" defense only in disparate impact cases brought under
Title VII, which challenge facially neutral policies that have a discrimi-
natory effect on protected classes.157 Jespersen surely was not bringing
a disparate impact claim, although the court's unequal burdens analy-
sis confusingly introduces examination of disparate effects into a dispa-
rate treatment case.
If the Ninth Circuit in Jespersen had followed Title VII's statutory
language and relevant Supreme Court precedent, Harrah's would
have lost not only its motion for summary judgment, but it would have
been left, on these facts, without any viable defense at trial. In fact,
because the case for disparate treatment seems so strong, I have won-
dered whether it might have made sense for Jespersen to file a cross-
that courts following Diaz have adopted a "very narrow standard for weighing customer
preference"); see generally Ann C. McGinley, Babes and Beefcake: Exclusive Hrnng Arrangements
and Sexy Dress Codes, 14 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 257 (2007) (analyzing sex-specific dress
codes and the BFOQ defense as applied to exclusive hiring of female cocktail servers in
Nevada casinos).
152. SeeJespersen, 444 F.3d at 1115.
153. Enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, Title
VII § 703(m), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000), provides: "[A]n unlawful employment prac-
tice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
154. Section 706(g) (2) (B) of Tide VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2) (B), provides that, if a
plaintiff "proves a violation under (section 703(m) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)]"
and the employer proves that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor," the court may award the plaintiff attorney's fees and
costs, and certain limited forms of declaratory and injunctive relief (excluding reinstate-
ment, hiring, promotion, or back pay), but not damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2) (B).
155. Civil Rights Act of 1991 (adding section 703(k) (2) to Title VII).
156. Id. (providing that "[a] demonstration that an employment practice is required by
business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimina-
tion under [Title VII]").
157. See Title VII § 703(k) (providing standards for the burden of proof in disparate
impact cases).
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motion for summary judgment. 15 8 Having argued, however, how the
Jespersen case might have come out differently if the court had paid
serious attention to the statute, I want to acknowledge the adage: "be
careful what you ask for." If courts were to strike down employer sex-
based dress, grooming, and appearance standards, I can imagine Con-
gress bowing to pressure from many service industries, particularly the
powerful casino gaming industry, by amending Title VII to provide a
safe harbor for sex-based dress and grooming codes.
C. The Potential Impact of Jespersen
The Jespersen decision, however, is now the law in the Ninth Cir-
cuit. What can we learn from it that might help a plaintiff survive a
motion for summary judgment in challenging a makeup requirement
for female workers? The court's unequal burdens analysis requires
plaintiffs to bear the burden of producing comparative evidence of
the cost and time for men and women of complying with the em-
ployer's sex-based policy. Meeting this burden would most likely be
cost effective only in Title VII class action or pattern-or-practice
suits, 1 5 9 but it is not difficult to imagine how one might go about col-
lecting such evidence. One could start with a shopping cart at the
nearest drug store and buy various brands of mascara, lipstick, blush,
and foundation. But from there it would get more complicated. How
often does a mascara wand have to be replaced? How much time, on
average, does it take to put on the required makeup, to freshen it up,
and to remove it? What about the costs and risks of allergies or infec-
tions from wearing cosmetics? 160
More problematic is the sex stereotyping approach. Even the
Ninth Circuit is not likely to tolerate under Title VII an employer pol-
icy that makes baristas wear negligees in order to have the job of sell-
ing steamed coffee at a roadside stand.1 6 1 Such a policy, assuming the
158. SeeJespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (noting that 'Jespersen makes no cross-motion for summary judgment, taking the
position that the case should go to thejury").
159. See Title VII § 707, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (providing authority for the federal gov-
ernment to bring "pattern-or-practice" discrimination claims in federal court).
160. See, e.g., Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting that makeup
"can cause serious discomfort, sometimes even allergic reactions, for someone unaccus-
tomed to wearing it").
161. The en banc court in Jespersen distinguished Harrah's dress code for its bartend-
ers, a "unisex uniform that covered Uespersen's] entire body and was designed for men
and women," from the skimpy, revealing uniform a female lobby attendant was required to
wear, which the district court found unlawful in EEOC v. Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. 599, 604
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112 (majority opinion).
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employer meets the numerosity requirements of Title VII, 16 2 would
signal an intent to make the employee "sexually provocative, and tend-
ing to stereotype women as sex objects."'1 63 Dress codes mandating
that female employees wear sexy, revealing tops, short skirts, and high
heels should be the "easy" cases under existing Title VII doctrine,
whether the theory is that such dress rules demean and objectify wo-
men or that they expose women to sexual harassment from supervi-
sors, co-workers, and customers. 164
The requirement that only female employees must wear makeup
for ajob like bartending, which is capable of being performed by both
men and women, is (but should not be) the hard case. If Harrah's can
legally impose this working condition on female employees, what,
other than the market, would stop any employer from adopting such
policies for its female employees? If Title VII permits employers to
adopt mandatory sex-based makeup rules for women, where does one
draw the line between makeup and other sex-based grooming rules,
for example, requiring women but not men to wear colored nail po-
lish or perfume? How can a plaintiff ever prove that an employer
adopted such a policy with "discriminatory or sexually stereotypical
intent"?165 The Jespersen en banc majority would not allow a jury to
draw its own inferences about intent from the face of Harrah's pol-
icy.166 Unlike the dissenters, 67 the majority did not believe that the
Supreme Court's evidentiary framework in Price Waterhouse-ruling
that sex-stereotyped assumptions, and hence, unlawful discriminatory
intent, can be inferred from a partner's suggestion that a female ac-
countant, among other things, wear makeup, jewelry, and feminine
clothing to improve her chances for promotion-would resolve the
issue either.168
162. Title VII, § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining an "employer" covered by Title
VII as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more em-
ployees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year"). Many vendors of food and beverages may not have enough
employees to be covered by Title VII, but may fall under analogous state fair-employment
statutes.
163. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112.
164. See id. at 1112-13.
165. Id. at 1112 (concluding that Harrah's grooming requirement "does not, on its
face, indicate any discriminatory or sexually stereotypical intent on the part of Harrah's").
166. Id. at 1106, 1111-12.
167. See id. at 1114-16 (Pregerson,J., dissenting); see also id. at 1116-17 ("I believe that
Jespersen articulated a classic case of Price Waterhouse discrimination.").
168. See id. at 1111-12 (majority opinion) (distinguishing the facts inJespersen from the
facts in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
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V. Evidence of the Harms of Sex Stereotyping
Under the Ninth Circuit's sex stereotyping framework inJespersen,
plaintiffs challenging an employer's sex-based dress or grooming pol-
icy, like the one that Harrah's adopted, may have to rely on social
science evidence and expert testimony in order to establish an unlaw-
ful sex-based motive for the policy. Because a single employee's aver-
sion to a sex-based dress or grooming requirement is subjective and
idiosyncratic, 169 plaintiffs will need to produce objective evidence of
the harms of a particular dress or grooming policy to the workers in
the protected class. There is a fairly extensive body of scholarship on
sex stereotyping, sex roles, and the effects of sexualization on males
and females in work settings and elsewhere. Some of these studies sug-
gest that sexualized appearance requirements in the workplace may
have an impact on the perceived competence, intelligence, prestige,
and status of the workers. Adolescent females appear to be particu-
larly vulnerable to exploitation by employer sex-based grooming and
appearance rules. But even older male and female workers may expe-
rience psychological harms as well as job loss because their occupa-
tions have been both feminized and sexualized. Following are several
examples of social science findings that might support a plaintiff's Ti-
tle VII sex-stereotyping challenge to an employer's sex-based dress or
grooming policy.
Early in 2007, the American Psychological Association released its
lengthy Report of the APA Task Force on the Sexualization of Girls,170 in
which it criticized the cosmetics industry for "marketing their prod-
ucts to younger and younger girls. " 171 The report concluded, among
other things, that "[c] osmetics and perfume are often associated spe-
cifically with the desire to be sexually attractive,"' 72 that "[c]hronic
attention to physical appearance leaves fewer cognitive resources avail-
able for other mental and physical activities,"173 and that "sef-sexual-
ization or sexualization by others is likely to have a negative impact on
women seeking professional careers."' 74 An earlier study examined
"whether the use of cosmetics significantly affect [sic] a woman's
probability of gaining professional or nonprofessional employ-
169. Id. at 1113 (finding that DarleneJespersen's aversion to wearing makeup was not
objectively reasonable, but only "the subjective reaction of a single employee").
170. AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON THE SEXUALIZATION OF
GIRLS (2007), available at www.apa.org/pi/wpo/sexualization.html.
171. Id. at 15.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 22.
174. Id. at 30.
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ment."'1 75 Noting that "[t]he traditional role of makeup, as indicated
in media presentations by the cosmetics industry, is to enhance femi-
nine beauty and sex appeal,"'1 76 the authors found that "perceived
makeup use is positively correlated with attractiveness, femininity, and
sexiness."'17 7 The authors concluded that "[c]osmetics use may en-
hance physical appearance, but it may also detract from perceived
competence on the job.' '1 78
A 2005 study of sex stereotypes and job status reported that "wo-
men are typically categorized into specific subtypes that cohere into
three primary clusters: traditional (e.g., homemaker), nontraditional
(e.g., career woman), and sexy,"'179 and that while "significantly alter-
ing one's physical attractiveness is difficult, . . . women can easily em-
phasize or deemphasize their sexuality through clothing and
demeanor."'18 0 This study concluded that "[p]articipants viewed [a]
sexy manager as less competent and less intelligent than [a] conserva-
tively dressed manager."''
A 1995 study of occupations found that "people organize their
images of occupations in a highly stereotyped, socially learned man-
ner."'182 Interestingly, the participants in this study rated the job of
bartender as neutral in perceived "gender type" and relatively low on
a scale measuring perceived "prestige" and "intelligence"-on the
same level as the feminine-typed jobs of postal clerk, clothing sewer,
and the more masculine jobs of assembler, factory machine operator,
and roofer.' 8 3 The job of bartender was also rated lower in "prestige/
intelligence" than the occupation rated most feminine-receptionist,
175. Cathryn L. Cox & William H. Glick, Resume Evaluatwns and Cosmetics Use: When
More Is Not Better, 14 SEx ROLES 51, 52 (1986).
176. Id. at 56.
177. Id. at 55.
178. Id. at 57. Wearing makeup had "virtually no effect if the woman applied for an
accountant position," but "there was a linear inverse relationship if the woman applied for
a secretarial position." Id. at 56. The authors reported that "[w]omen applying for secreta-
rial positions with no makeup received the highest ratings" and "women with heavy
makeup applying for secretarial positions were particularly negatively evaluated." Id.
179. Peter Glick et al., Evaluations of Sexy Women in Low- and High-Status Jobs, 29
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 389, 389 (2005); see also C. Nathan DeWall et al., Understanding the
Structure of Stereotypes of Women: Virtue and Agency as Dimensions Distinguishing Female Sub-
groups, 29 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 396 (2005).
180. Glick et al., supra note 179, at 389.
181. Id. at 393.
182. Peter Glick et al., Images of Occupations: Components of Gender and Status in Occupa-
tional Stereotypes, 32 SEx ROLES 565, 566 (1995).
183. See id. at 576 fig.1 (Map of Occupations by Gender-Type and Prestige/
Intelligence).
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as well as lower than a number of other feminine occupations in the
mid-range of the "prestige/intelligence" scale. 184 As women have
moved into the bartending profession in great numbers in the late
twentieth century, the occupation has lost its salient link to the male
gender that was enforced by legal rules and social norms from the late
1800s to the 197 0s.18 5 The job of bartending, like many other service-
sector jobs, also appears to be losing status as it is being both sexed up
and dumbed down.
As bartending becomes more sexualized, we might expect the oc-
cupation to become more stereotyped as feminine, and perhaps drop
even lower in "prestige/intelligence" status, moving further down the
"prestige/intelligence" scale from high-status "feminine" jobs like le-
gal secretary and high school teacher. 186 If the job of bartender is be-
ing sexualized as it is being feminized, bar and casino owners may be
looking for younger, thinner, sexier females to fill these positions. As
one researcher noted, many front-of-the-house jobs in restaurants for
hostesses, bartenders, and food and beverage servers are going to
"thin, attractive, young, outgoing, and mostly white" women. 187 At one
restaurant, the researcher reported, the pressure on a waitress to keep
thin imposed "psychological harm caused by being viewed as a body
rather than a skilled person."' 88
The sexualization of women's work can be observed throughout
the service economy in retail work, 18 9 clerical work, °90 and especially
184. Id.
185. See Avery & Crain, supra note 3, at 92-100 (discussing the feminization of
bartending).
186. See Glick et al., supra note 182, at 576 fig.1.
187. Danielle Dirks, "It Comes with the Territory": Women Restaurant Workers' Exper-
iences of Sexual Harassment and Sexual Objectification 27 (2004) (unpublished M.A. the-
sis, University of Florida) (on file with author).
188. Id.; see also Elaine J. Hall, Waitering/Waitressing: Engendering the Work of Table Servers,
7 GENDER & Soc'y 329, 334 (1993) (examining "the way restaurants use job titles and
uniforms to reaffirm the gendered service style that workers are expected to perform and
the way servers use them to negotiate the gender meanings of their jobs"); Meika Loe,
Working for Men-At the Intersection of Power, Gender, and Sexuality, 66 Soc. INQuIRv 399
(1996).
189. See, e.g., Lynne Pettinger, Gendered Work Meets Gendered Goods: Selling and Service in
Clothing Retail, 12 GENDER WORK & ORG. 460 (2005); see also Karen D. Hughes & Vela Tadic,
"Something to Deal With": Customer Sexual Harassment and Women's Retail Service Work in Ca-
nada, 5 GENDER WORK & ORG. 207 (1998).
190. See, e.g., Jackie Krasas Rogers & Kevin D. Henson, "Hey, Why Don't You Wear a
Shorter Shrt?": Structural Vulnerability and the Organization of Sexual Harassment in Temporary
Clerical Employment, 11 GENDER & Soc' 215, 221 (1997) (noting that "[a]lthough tempo-
rary agencies are legally required to operate under the equal opportunity employer legisla-
tion . . . , temporaries are nevertheless often hired or placed for personal characteristics
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in the casino gaming,19 ' and food and beverage industries.' 9 2 It is a
world-wide phenomenon. For example, the Hooters chain is now ex-
porting its restaurant franchises, along with job openings for Hooters
Girls, in places like South Korea where waitresses are hired on the
basis of "age, stature, and weight" and wear the "skimpy uniforms" of
"white tank tops and small orange shorts." 93
The burdens of the sexing up and dumbing down of women's
work do not fall just on women-who, it must be acknowledged,
sometimes seek and desire many service jobs for their high tips, flexi-
ble hours, and even the life style. I believe two groups in society today
are being particularly harmed by this trend. One group is adolescent
female workers and the second group is older (and sometimes even
not-quite-middle-aged) men and women.
The proliferation of low-wage, part-time service jobs, particularly
in retail and food and beverage establishments, has both drawn on
and enabled the employment of large numbers of young workers be-
tween the ages of fifteen and nineteen.1 94 As one researcher noted:
Retail and food service companies routinely exploit the sexuality of
young workers (women especially) in order to attract customers
and increase sales. More generally, employers staff their stores by
hiring young workers who have the right "look"-they screen, in
their recruitment and hiring process, for an appearance, attitude
and demeanor that is strongly age, gender, race and class based.
1 9 5
other than their jobs [sic] skills. Even some of the more specific and egregious requests
(e.g., for a young, blond woman with great legs) are often honored").
191. See, e.g., Gersh Kuntzman, Must Casino Waitresses Be Thin?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18,
2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7047491/site/newsweek/print/1/displaymode/
1098/.
192. See, e.g., Waitresses Dressed as Naughty Nurses Ple RNs, MSNBC.coM, Dec. 8, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16112393/ (reporting that at the Heart Attack Grill in
Tempe, Arizona, the waitresses wear "naughty nurse uniforms"-"skimpy, cleavage-baring
outfits, high heels and thigh-high stockings-a male fantasy that some nursing organiza-
tions say is an insult to the profession").
193. Kim Rahn, Girls Get Big Bucks for Short Shorts, KOREA TIMES, Feb. 2, 2007, http://
ww.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/news-view.asp?newsdx=3068355.
194. For example, the November 2000 Report on the Youth Labor Force reports that
"[d]uring the 1996-98 period, 2.9 million youths aged 15 to 17 worked during school
months, and 4.0 million worked during the summer months." BUREAu OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS, U.S DEP'T OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, TRENDS IN YOUTH EMPLOYMENT 30
(2000). The report indicates that thirty-one percent of males aged fifteen to seventeen,
and thirty-three percent of females were employed in eating and drinking establishments
during the school months. See id. at 44 tbl.4.9.
195. Stuart Tannock, Why Do Working Youth Work Where They Do?-A Report from
the Young Worker Project 15 (Mar. 2002) (unpublished manuscript from Center for Labor
Research and Education, U.C. Berkeley) (on file with author); see also Stuart Tannock &
Sara Flocks, "I Know What It's Like to Struggle ' The Working Lives of Young Students in an Urban
Community College, 28 LAB. STUD. J., Spring 2003, at 1, 9 (observing that "[y]oung female
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Not long ago, Abercrombie & Fitch, in a well-publicized settle-
ment with the EEOC, agreed to change its allegedly discriminatory
sex- and race-based hiring and marketing practices.1 96 But one must
wonder if a sixteen-year-old girl, regardless of whether she never uses
cosmetics or she occasionally (or even always) wears makeup, would
even consider challenging an employer's requirement that she wear a
prescribed "template" of lipstick, mascara, and blush while serving
hamburgers and fries. One must also wonder whether the EEOC
would consider such a grooming rule, imposed on females only, to be
worth pursuing on its own.
When, as in one recent case, a court must resort to state statutory
rape laws in order to rule that a sixteen-year-old girl did not "wel-
come" sexual intercourse with her twenty-five-year-old supervisor and
thus satisfied the "unwelcomeness" element of her hostile work envi-
ronment claim under Title VII, 19 7 we should wonder what law or prin-
ciple outside Title VII might be asserted to stop employers from
requiring that their adolescent female workers appear sexed up and
dolled up for work. Consider these facts: In 1997 " [t] eenage girls 12 to
19 years of age spent over $8 billion on beauty products," and
"[b]etween 2000 and 2005, there was a 15% increase in teen (age 18
and younger) invasive cosmetic surgery and a 7% increase in mini-
mally invasive cosmetic procedures."1 98 To what extent do employer
appearance rules for entry-level jobs for adolescent females add fuel
to these trends?
An example of the harms of these sex-based hiring practices and
appearance rules to older men and women can be found in a recent,
somewhat ironic, development that is a mirror image of Darlene Jes-
persen's lawsuit. In the summer of 2006, a group of unionized male
bartenders, ranging in age from forty to almost sixty-five, who were
employed at the MGM Mirage in Las Vegas, filed an age-discrimina-
tion complaint with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission. 199 After ex-
hausting their administrative remedies, they brought an age
student workers, especially, are forced daily to deal with the demeaning consequences of
retail and food service employers who routinely and often blatantly exploit their sexuality
in order to attract customers and increase sales").
196. See Avery & Crain, supra note 3, at 22-23 & n.46.
197. See Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 713-14 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 1815 (2007).
198. Am. PSYCHOL. ASS'N, supra note 170, at 24.
199. Liz Benston, Youth, Good Looks a Gold Mine on LV Strip, LAS VEGAS SUN, May 19,
2006, http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/sun/200 6 /may/19/566616673.html?
Youth, %20Good%2OLooks%20a%2OGold% 20Mine%20on%20LV% 20Strip.
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discrimination lawsuit in federal court.200 The essence of their claim
was that they had been "passed over for plum jobs at new venues such
as Jet and Stack, a hip restaurant," in favor of young men and wo-
men. 20 1 The Culinary Union has contracts with the management orga-
nizations that run these new "hip" venues that permit them "to hire
who they want, based on appearance. "202 Even as these older Las
Vegas bartenders are losing job opportunities to younger workers, ex-
perienced cocktail waitresses in their mid-to-late twenties, who are not
protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,20 3 are also
finding themselves losing out on new highly paid jobs to "buxom wait-
resses in their early 20s, with little or no experience.
'
"
20 4
So we have come full circle in the last hundred or so years. Older,
experienced male bartenders are now being kept out of good jobs
because their unions and employers are enforcing a new set of sex-
based stereotypes about who is qualified to do the job. Now, like
Darlene Jespersen (or Mary Maguire in 1881), they can turn to the law
to assert their rights to equal employment opportunity. But the path
of the Jespersen litigation does not suggest that taking on the casino
industry and its appearance standards through federal antidiscrimina-
tion law is likely to yield favorable results. If the unions oppose the
older bartenders' interests, the bartenders must seek new, more sym-
pathetic, allies in the community, and new legal and political
strategies.
VI. Conclusion
In closing I would like to leave you with this one thought that
came to my mind as I reflected on the Jespersen case and the history of
men and women in bartending in the United States. I was thinking
about the male veterans who returned from World War II, reclaiming
their old bartending jobs and ousting the female bartenders. I
imagined a different, hypothetical, narrative for Darlene Jespersen.
Suppose before Harrah's adopted its "Personal Best" grooming code,
Jespersen had left her long-time job as a Harrah's bartender to enlist
in the United States Army. After an honorable discharge, and possibly
200. Telephone Interview with Liz Benston, Reporter, Las Vegas Sun, in Las Vegas,
Nev. (Mar. 9, 2007).
201. Benston, supra note 199.
202. Id.
203. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), § 12(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 631 (2000), covers only "individuals who are at least 40 years of age." Id.
204. Benston, supra note 199.
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valorous service in a field of war, she returns to her hometown, Reno,
Nevada, and, relying on her federal rehire rights for military veter-
ans, 20 5 she seeks to return to her formerjob at Harrah's casino only to
discover that she is now required to wear makeup as a condition of
working behind the bar. Harrah's is happy to have her work without
wearing makeup, earning the same pay (but, most likely, not the same
tips) in a job somewhere else in the casino, just not the front of the
house. Now, the Army's dress code is hardly a model of gender equal-
ity, but-even in the Army---women are "authorized" but not required "to
wear cosmetics with all uniforms." 20 6 I am not sure what sex equality
means today when a female bartender returning from military service
could be required to wear makeup in order to reclaim her old job in a
casino, but she could serve and even die for her country without being
required to wear lipstick, powder, blush, and mascara. Of course, I am
not suggesting that we doll up our female soldiers. What I am sug-
gesting is that we seriously rethink our discrimination law on work-
place appearance and grooming codes before another generation of
women gets sexed up and dumbed down on the job.
205. See Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38
U.S.C. § 4312 (2000) (requiring employers to rehire former employees who have served in
the military for five years or less).
206. U.S. DEP'T OF rHE ARvY, REC. 670-1, WEAR AND APPEARANCE OF ARMY UNIFORMS
AND INSIGNIA para. 1(8.b) (2005), available at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/
r6701 .pdf.
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